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Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cornell, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 35, 90 P.3d 978 (June 7, 
2004)1 
 
INSURANCE LAW – COVERAGE 
 
Summary 
 
 Fire Insurance Exchange (“FIE”) appealed an order granting the respondents 
summary judgment that concluded FIE’s homeowner’s liability coverage extended to 
negligent supervision resulting in intentional acts and child molestation. 
 
Outcome/Disposition 
 
 Reversed and remanded with instructions.  The court reversed the Eighth Judicial 
District Court’s decision by determining that FIE’s policy did not cover an “insured’s 
alleged negligent supervision of an adult son who commits statutory sexual seduction.”2  
Thus, the court remanded the matter and instructed the district court to enter summary 
judgment in favor of FIE. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 While living with his parents, nineteen-year-old Milton Hernandez had sexual 
intercourse with the twelve-year-old daughter of the respondents Ron and Dawn Cornell.  
Subsequently, the state prosecuted Hernandez and he pleaded guilty to four counts of 
statutory sexual seduction.  At the time of the incident, a homeowner’s liability policy 
issued by FIE insured Hernandez’ parents, Gonzalo and Maria Villalobos.  The Cornells 
filed a civil suit against Hernandez and the Villalobos.   
 The portion of the suit relating to the Villalobos alleged they had negligently 
supervised Hernandez.  The Villalobos turned the defense of the suit over to FIE because 
they believed their homeowner’s policy covered the claim.  FIE filed a declaratory relief 
action against the Cornells, Villalobos and Hernandez.  The declaration sought judicial 
recognition that the policy issued by FIE to the Villalobos did not cover statutory sexual 
seduction.  Hernandez and the Villalobos failed to respond to FIE’s complaint and the 
district court entered a default judgment in favor of FIE.3  However, the court ruled that 
                                                 
1 By Angela Morrison. 
2 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 35, 4 (June 7, 2004). 
3 The liability policy at issue in the case contained clauses excluding both intentional acts and child 
molestation.  The court pointed out that the policy:  
does not cover “bodily injury or property damage . . . is either . . . 
caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured; or . . . results 
from any occurrence caused by an intentional act of any insured where 
the results are reasonable foreseeable.”  Second, and more specifically, 
the policy excludes: 
[A]ctual or alleged injury or 
medical expenses caused by or 
arising out of the actual, alleged, or 
threatened molestation of a child by 
the judgment did not bar the Cornells from seeking any other proceeds available to them 
under the policy.   
 After FIE and the Cornells both filed motions for summary judgment, the court 
granted summary judgment to the Cornells.  The court held that the insurance policy 
covered the Villalobos as negligent coinsureds.  It further determined the policy did not 
cover Hernandez.  FIE appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the insurance policy did not cover the 
Villalobos as negligent coinsureds.  Although the policy required FIE to indemnify and 
defend the Villalobos for damages caused by an “occurrence,” the court reasoned that a 
homeowner’s negligent supervision which results in sexual molestation is not an 
“occurrence.”4  The court pointed out that the policy defined “‘occurrence’ as an accident 
resulting in bodily injury.”5  As previously stated by the court, an accident is “‘a 
happening that is not expected, foreseen, or intended.’”6  Because the damages to the 
victim arose from an intentional act, the court reasoned the damages could not be an 
occurrence.7  Additionally, the court stated the Villalobos’ “failure to prevent the sexual 
seduction [was] not an ‘accident’ . . . ”8 
 Finally, the court found the child molestation exclusion clause in the policy 
applied to actions on the part of the insured that result in child molestation.  Thus, the 
Cornells’ argument that the policy only excluded damages caused by the actor and not 
those caused by the negligence of the insured failed.  As a result, the court reversed the 
district court and instructed the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of FIE. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This decision has implications beyond an insurer’s liability in suits arising out of 
child molestation.  For instance, the court’s narrow characterization of “occurrence” as an 
accident resulting in bodily injury could prevent insureds from seeking indemnification 
for damages resulting in mental distress.  Moreover, in cases where an insurance policy 
includes an exclusion clause for any intentional act, the court’s finding regarding the 
child molestation clause could bar recovery under the policy for any negligent 
supervision claims.  Hence, the court’s decision will result in less insureds receiving 
indemnification from their insurance companies.  
                                                                                                                                                 
. . . any insured . . . .   Molestation 
includes but is not limited to any 
act of sexual misconduct, sexual 
molestation, or physical or mental 
abuse of a minor. 
Id. at 2-3. 
4 Id. at 4. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. (quoting Beckwith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 83 P.3d 275, 276 (2004)).     
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 5. 
